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FORUM JURIDICUM
MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH-HIGGINBOTHAM
REVERSES TREND AND CREATES NEW QUESTIONS
Frank L. Maraist*
Seldom has an area of law produced as much surprise to
those who study and practice it as has maritime wrongful death
in recent years. The latest surprising, and, to many, disap-
pointing decision was handed down by the Supreme Court dur-
ing the past term in Mobil Oil Corporation v. Higginbotham,'
in which the Court held that beneficiaries may not recover for
loss of society in actions for wrongful death arising outside
territorial waters. The simple holding and the rationale-that
common law in derogation of a statute may not supplant the
statute-present no real problems, but the decision represents
a startling reversal of the judicial trend toward uniformity and
liberal recovery begun eight years ago in the unexpected and
celebrated decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.'
The importance of Higginbotham can be appreciated only
through an understanding of the trend and its reversal, and
what the latter may bring.
HISTORY
Like its land counterpart,3 admiralty tort law initially re-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978).
2. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
3. The history of the general common law rule that there can be no tort recovery
when the victim dies was summarized by Justice Harlan in Moragne in the following
language:
Legal historians have concluded that the sole substantial basis for the rule
at common law is a feature of the early English law that did not survive into
this century-the felony-merger doctrine. See [F.1 Pollock, [Law of Torts 55
(London ed. 1951)1; Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32
L.Q. Rev. 431 (1916). According to this doctrine, the common law did not allow
civil recovery for an act that constituted both a tort and a felony. The tort was
treated as less important than the offense against the Crown, and was merged
into, or pre-empted by, the felony. Smith v. Sykes, 1 Freem. 224, 89 Eng. Rep.
160 (K.B. 1677); Higgins v. Butcher, Yel. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1606). The
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fused to recognize recovery when either the victim or the tort-
feasor died.' However, legislatures of each of the states repu-
diated the common law rule barring recovery for torts on land
by passing non-abatement,5 wrongful death,' and survival7
statutes, or some combination thereof.' Accordingly, the com-
mon law rule that the tort died with the victim (or the tortfea-
sor, although the latter had been less significant)' ceased to be
of importance in general tort law.
doctrine found practical justification in the fact that the punishment for the
felony was the death of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown;
thus, after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of the felon or his
property on which to base a civil action. Since all intentional or negligent homi-
cide was felonious, there could be no civil suit for wrongful death.
The first explicit statement of the common-law rule against recovery for
wrongful death came in the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, sitting at nisi prius,
in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). That opinion did
not cite authority, or give supporting reasoning, or refer to the felony-merger
doctrine in announcing that '[in a civil Court, the death of a human being
could not be complained of as an injury.' Ibid. Nor had the felony-merger doc-
trine seemingly been cited as the basis for the denial of recovery in any of the
other reported wrongful-death cases since the earliest ones, in the 17th century.
E.g., Smith v. Sykes, supra; Higgins v. Butcher, supra. However, it seems clear
from those first cases that the rule of Baker v. Bolton did derive from the felony-
merger doctrine, and that there was no other ground on which it might be
supported even at the time of its inception ....
398 U.S. at 382-83.
4. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); George & Moore, Wrongful Death and
Survival Actions Under the General Maritime Law: Pre-Harrisburg Through Post
Moragne, 4 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 1 (1972); Sacchetti, Survival of Tort Actions Under
Federal Maritime Law, 16 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 801 (1975).
5. Survival and non-abatement statutes have a similar effect. Where the victim
has filed suit prior to his death, the issue is frequently expressed in terms of whether
the action he has filed has "abated," or whether his heirs or beneficiaries may continue
the maintenance of the suit for the damages he could have recovered if he had lived.
Where the victim has not filed suit prior to death, then the issue is frequently expressed
in terms of whether his heirs or beneficiaries may commence and maintain an action
for the damages he could have recovered if he had lived; this latter action is generally
referred to as the "survival action." The distinction may be important in maritime law
because the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) provides for "non-abatement" of
a commenced action, but makes no provision for a survival action. See 46 U.S.C. §
765 (1920).
6. All fifty states have now passed wrongful death statutes. See S. SPEISER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.8 (1966).
7. Most states have enacted survival statutes. See S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at
24.
8. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 126 at 900 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 900 (1939); S. SPEISER, supra note 6; Smith, Wrongful Death Damages in
North Carolina, 44 N.C. L. REV. 402, 405, 406 nn.17 & 18 (1966).
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Congress, however, did not fully abrogate the maritime
common law tort rule barring recovery for wrongful death. Dur-
ing the decade between 1910 and 1920, Congress provided re-
covery for wrongful death in Jones Act (negligence) claims"'
and also provided recovery for wrongful death occurring on the
high seas, outside territorial waters." The Jones Act applies
only to suits by beneficiaries of seamen brought against their
decedent's employer on the basis of negligence, regardless
of where the death occurs; the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) applies to beneficiaries of all decedents, including
seamen, but only if the wrongful act causing death occurs be-
yond three miles. Neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA permits
recovery for "non-pecuniary" losses sustained by the benefi-
ciaries, and the latter act does not provide survival benefits.
Congress also did not provide statutory recovery for claims
(other than negligence actions by a seaman's beneficiaries
against his employer) for wrongful death within three miles.
In such cases, the maritime common law "borrowed" state
wrongful death statutes." However, an admiralty plaintiff
claiming death benefits under such a borrowed statute took
the state act as he found it and was subject to all restrictions
which the act placed upon recovery, including limitation stat-
utes and bars to recovery based on contributory negligence.' 3
The combination of a common law rule generally denying
recovery for wrongful death and a limited response by Congress
9. The common law initially barred recovery where either the victim or the
tortfeasor died. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 898-99. There has been some statutory
abrogation by states of the common law rule against recovery where the tortfeasor died,
but neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA speaks to the issue. Admiralty courts, however,
have refused to continue the rule. For a discussion of the present status of the rule in
admiralty law, see Judge Rubin's opinion in McKeithen v. S. S. Frosta, 435 F. Supp.
584, 586 (E.D. La. 1977).
10. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
11. 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1920), the Death on the High Seas Act. The term
"territorial waters" as used herein refers to those waters from the coast line to three
miles seaward and is contrasted with the "high seas," which begin three miles beyond
the coast line. Generally, "territorial waters" are treated as being within the bounda-
ries of the adjacent state, and state law applies by its own force where there is no
applicable federal law. Beyond three miles, on the "high seas," most courts hold that
state law does not apply, but that federal law may "borrow" an applicable state
statute. See, e.g., Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3rd Cir. 1974).
12. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
13. The Tungus v. Skorgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
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produced by 1970 an inconsistent pattern of recovery for mari-
time torts causing death. Where a seaman died as a result of
negligence chargeable to his employer, his beneficiaries could
recover both wrongful death and survival benefits, but recovery
was limited to pecuniary loss. Where a seaman's death was
caused by unseaworthiness and the accident occurred within
territorial waters, his beneficiaries could not recover from the
vessel owner. There was no federal statute permitting such
wrongful death recovery, and no maritime common law rem-
edy. While state statutes otherwise could have been
"borrowed" under common law to permit recovery, the Su-
preme Court ruled that in adopting the Jones Act, Congress
preempted any application of state law, including a state
wrongful death statute, to claims by seamen against their em-
ployers.' 4
Where a non-seaman was killed within territorial waters,
his beneficiaries could recover only through the applicable
state statute. In each case, the court was required to determine
whether the state legislature intended to extend the statute to
the wrongful conduct in question. Thus, in the event of a
Sieracki seaman 5 was killed within three miles, a judge was
required to determine whether a legislature, which collectively
was ignorant of the existence of a condition known as unsea-
worthiness, "intended" to extend wrongful death benefits to
the beneficiaries of persons killed by that condition.
Beyond three miles, the beneficiaries of all victims (except
seamen killed through employer negligence, who were covered
by the Jones Act) could recover wrongful death benefits under
the provisions of DOHSA. That act, however, did not provide
for recovery of survival benefits, 7 although recovery of such
14. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
15. Since the nineteenth century, a seaman has been entitled to a warranty of
seaworthiness from the vessel on which he served and its operator. Subsequent to the
creation of this protection, the Supreme Court ruled that a non-seaman who was
aboard a vessel doing the work of a member of the crew was entitled to the same
warranty of seaworthiness as was a crew member. This decision came in Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), thus giving rise to the designation "Sieracki sea-
man."
16. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. at 401 n.15.
17. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1920); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §
631 at 364 (2d ed. 1975); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Dennis v.
Gulf S. S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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benefits was sometimes permitted by "borrowing" the survival
statute of a state with significant contacts with the accident
and victims.'8
The crazy-quilt pattern resulting from the common law
rule, the limited Congressional response, and the "borrowing"
of state wrongful death statutes produced a great deal of uncer-
tainty and several intolerable anomalies. Among the latter
were that: (1) the beneficiaries of a seaman killed within three
miles could not recover if the accident was caused by unseawor-
thiness, but the beneficiaries of a Sieracki seaman could re-
cover if state law afforded a remedy; and (2) whether benefici-
aries of a seaman killed through unseaworthiness could recover
depended upon whether the fatal accident occurred within or
beyond territorial waters.'9
Moragne-A NEW COMMON LAW REMEDY
In 1970 the Supreme Court in Moragne unanimously over-
ruled eighty-four years and innumerable expressions of mari-
time common law prohibiting recovery in death cases except
where permitted by statute, and declared that henceforth ad-
miralty common law would grant such recovery. Justice Harlan
was assigned the Herculean task of expressing with convincing
logic the Court's reversal of form, and he responded with an
opinion which ranks among the classics in maritime law.
The Moragne decision allowed recovery by beneficiaries of
longshoremen and seamen killed within territorial waters as a
result of the unseaworthy condition of a vessel. Events follow-
ing Moragne, however, lessened the importance of the decision
Section 765 of DOHSA provides that in the event of the death of a victim after
suit has been filed to recover his personal injuries, his beneficiaries may be substituted
in the action and may recover the damages to which they are entitled under DOHSA,
i.e., wrongful death damages. The section has not been interpreted as having any effect
upon survival actions beyond three miles.
18. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1971); United States
v. The S. S. Washington, 172 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va. 1959), aff'd. sub nom., United
States v. Texas Co., 272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1959); Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc.,
280 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.
N.Y. 1962); In re Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); McLaughlin v.
Blidberg Rothchild Co., 167 F. Supp. 714 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
19. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. at 396; see also G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 17, § 6-32 at 36.
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to these beneficiaries. First, the problem of the Sieracki sea-
man and his warranty of seaworthiness practically, if not ac-
tually, disappeared with the 1972 amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act.2" Then, in Usner v. Luck-
enbach Overseas Corp.,2' the Supreme Court aborted the bud-
ding doctrine of "instant unseaworthiness," thus reducing the
number of instances in which a seaman's death was due to
conduct classified as unseaworthiness. Since other wrongful
death actions within territorial waters involving ordinary tort
actions or seamen negligence claims were clearly within the
reach of borrowed state statutes, Moragne would have had lit-
tle lasting impact if it had been confined to territorial waters
and if the damages it afforded (an issue not reached in
Moragne) had not exceeded those provided by the Jones Act
and DOHSA.
However, Moragne left unanswered several questions
whose impact on maritime law could have been great and last-
ing. One such question was whether the Moragne remedy was
limited to actions within three miles, or whether it applied
beyond territorial waters, thus encroaching upon DOHSA.
Another was whether Moragne covered the claims of .a sea-
man's beneficiaries suing the seaman's employer for negligent
conduct, thus invading the domain of the Jones Act. A third
question was whether Moragne provided benefits not recovera-
ble under DOHSA or the Jones Act. Finally, if Moragne did
apply beyond three miles, or in seaman-employer negligence
actions, and it permitted recovery of items of damages, or relief
to beneficiaries, not allowed by those acts, would it supersede
them? The answer to the first of these questions was relatively
certain: if there is a common law in a jurisdiction, it logically
applies throughout the territorial limits of the jurisdiction.
Thus, the lower courts assumed that Moragne applied beyond
three miles, although there was no affirmative expression to
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1972). In particular note the amendments to §§
903(a) and 905(a) and (b). These sections substitute a negligence action for the war-
ranty of seaworthiness formerly owed by the shipowner to the maritime worker. Since
the 905(b) negligence action, which is governed by land tort principles, should be
encompassed within every wrongful death statute, the maritime common law wrongful
death recovery would appear no longer necessary for actions by maritime workers
against vessel owners.
21. 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
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that effect by the Supreme Court until the Higginbotham deci-
sion."
The Court decided the third question, and set the stage for
resolution of the final question in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet.13 There, a divided Court held that in an action involv-
ing death within territorial waters; the Moragne remedy in-
cluded damages for loss of society, the kind of "non-pecuniary"
damages not permitted under either the Jones Act or DOHSA.
From this point, it was only a matter of time before the courts
were presented with a Moragne/DOHSA clash: where a victim
had been killed beyond three miles, could his survivors recover
loss of society or other non-pecuniary damages? The first two
appellate courts to receive the problem reached opposite con-
clusions; the First Circuit, in Barbe v. Drummond,4 held that
DOHSA prevailed and that the Moragne-Gaudet non-
pecuniary benefits were not available. However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 5 reached the opposite con-
clusion. The latter circuit was in "good company"; admiralty's
preeminent scholars, Gilmore and Black, had suggested that
Moragne eventually would make both DOHSA and the wrong-
ful death provisions of the Jones Act superfluous."6
Higginbotham-NEw ANOMALIES
It was in this setting that the Supreme Court granted writs
22. See Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Spiller v. Thomas H.
Lowe, Jr., & Assoc. Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972); Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F.
Supp. 1 (E.D. La. 1971). There is no clear pronouncement in Higginbotham that the
Moragne remedy applies beyond three miles, and there are statements which may be
construed as implying that it does not. Thus, the Court stated that "DOHSA governs
wrongful death recoveries on the high seas ...." 98 S. Ct. at 2014. Similarly, the
majority commented about the "difference between applying one national rule to
fatalities in terrritorial waters and a slightly narrower national rule to accidents farther
from land." Id. at n.18. All of the other significant language in the decision implies
that DOHSA governs only when it is specifically applicable, and that in those areas
about which DOHSA is silent, admiralty common law would be dispositive. That
language, and the illogic in accepting a common law rule that is applicable by its own
force only in certain geographical areas of the jurisdiction which adopts it, leads to the
assumption that there is no merit to the argument that in Higginbotham the Court
was holding that Moragne applied only in territorial waters.
23. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
24. 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
25. 510 F.2d 242 (5th Cir.), on rehearing, 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975).
26. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, at § 6-33.
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in a subsequent Fifth Circuit case, Higginbotham, and handed
down a surprising decision, which concluded in these terms:
The Death on the High Seas Act. . . announces Congress'
considered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries,
the limitations period, contributory negligence, survival
and damages .... The Act does not address every issue
of wrongful death law,. . . but when it does speak directly
to a question, the courts are not free to "supplement"
Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes
meaningless.27
Since Congress in DOHSA had "spoken directly" to the issue
of non-pecuniary damages, the courts were not free to supple-
ment the DOHSA remedy by allowing such damages through
Moragne.
The command of Higginbotham is clear: common law in
derogation of a statute must yield to the statute." However,
application of the command presents new problems, such as:
1. When has Congress "spoken directly" to issues of
wrongful death or survival?
2. When does allowance by the common law of a remedy
not authorized by congressional act "so thoroughly
[supplement the Act] that the Act becomes meaningless?"
3. Finally, if the differences between the maritime com-
mon law and statutory remedies produce the same kinds of
anomalies as those resulting from the federal and state statu-
tory remedies in pre-Moragne days, may these anomalies
persist? If not, since the statutes must prevail, must the com-
mon law yield?
All of these questions will be answered; the only issue is
by whom. Congress, of course, may respond by adopting a gen-
eral death action applicable to all deaths within the maritime
jurisdiction, including those within territorial waters. If Con-
gress does act, it should reconsider some of its earlier decisions
27. 98 S. Ct. at 2015.
28. The difficulties involved in maintaining a common law remedy in the face
of a legislative scheme for recovery could have been realized by a review of the Georgia
experience. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043 (1965).
Since Moragne, at least one state, Massachusetts, has recognized a common law
wrongful death remedy even though there was a preexisting statutory remedy. See
Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972).
[Vol. 39
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in DOHSA and the Jones Act, such as those denying recovery
for non-pecuniary damages, utilizing statutes of limitation;
and using language which denies recovery to the beneficiaries
of a victim who settles his claim and then dies of causes result-
ing from the accident.29 The legislative body may also reassess
the wisdom of providing differing statutes of limitation, differ-
ing classes of beneficiaries, and differing elements of recovery
for negligence and unseaworthiness, a result now produced by
the combination of the Jones Act and DOHSA.
If Congress does not act, the courts must answer the ques-
tions, and given the great volume of maritime wrongful death
litigation in recent years, the answers should not be long in
coming. Many problems and anomalies will have to be consid-
ered.
1. The Beneficiaries
There appears to be no conflict between DOHSA and the
maritime common law (hereinafter Moragne); the same benefi-
ciaries take as a group under each theory of recovery.:"' How-
ever, a major anomaly may occur in application; DOHSA bene-
ficiaries need not be dependent, but may only recover pecuni-
ary loss, 3' while Moragne beneficiaries may not have to be de-
pendent,32 but can'recover non-pecuniary loss, i.e., loss of so-
ciety.3 3 Thus, if Gaudet remains intact, non-dependent rela-
tives may be able to recover loss of society under Moragne,
while not being able to recover any damages under DOHSA.
Jones Act beneficiaries take in classes, each exclusive of
subsequent classes.34 There is potential for conflict with
29. The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in interpreting the com-
mon law wrongful death remedy in Gaudet. For a discussion of the status of the law
on this issue, see Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 579.
30. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1920); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, § 6-30 at 361;
The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947).
31. In re Cambia S.S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691 (D.C. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d
517 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 975 (1975); Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp.,
438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971), on remand, 34 F. Supp. 324; Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); The City of Rome, 48 F.2d 333 (S.D.
N.Y. 1930); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 260 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
32. See, e.g., Consolidated Machines, Inc. v. Protein Products Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 209 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
33. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
34. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939), incorporated by 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
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Moragne, because Moragne beneficiaries apparently take as a
group, and beneficiaries in a higher class do not appear to
preempt recovery by beneficiaries in a lower class. The issue
then is whether Moragne supplements the Jones Act to a
greater extent than it supplements DOHSA. The answer is not
free from doubt. Actually, the Jones Act may not represent
"Congress' considered judgment" on wrongful death recovery
for seamen; it was passed primarily to afford a personal injury
action for negligence, and was effected by a simple "wholesale"
adoption of the Federal Employees Liability Act (FELA), pre-
viously passed by Congress to afford a remedy for railway em-
ployees. 31 If the Jones Act does represent Congress' "considered
judgment," then Congress has spoken to the question, for the
FELA clearly designates the beneficiaries, the order in which
they take, and the exclusivity of recovery.
2. Non-Pecuniary Damages
Where DOHSA applies, non-pecuniary damages seem to
be foreclosed by Higginbotham. However, while DOHSA ex-
pressly limits recovery to pecuniary damages, 31 the Jones Act
contains no similar explicit limitation; it is the courts that have
interpreted the FELA, and hence the Jones Act, as limiting
recovery to pecuniary damages. Thus, it is arguable that even
if the Jones Act represents Congress' "considered judgment,"
that body has not "spoken directly to the question" of recovery
of non-pecuniary damages. 37 However, it may be equally argu-
35. 'Congress, when it passed the Jones Act, apparently did not want to waste
any time on thinking about the special problems of maritime workers. As a thought
saving device, the draftsman hit on the odd expedient of incorporating another statute
by reference." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, § 6-26 at 351. Gilmore and Black
also describe the statute as a little noticed provision, unrelated to the balance of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which did not draw much attention on its way through
committee to the floor of the House and the Senate. Id. at § 6-26, at 327.
36. "The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss ...." 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1920); see also the cases listed in note 31, supra.
Unlike DOHSA, the Jones Act does not expressly limit recovery to pecuniary damages.
37. The Jones Act provides that "in case of the death of any seaman as a result
of. . .personal injury, the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an
action for damages at law ...." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920). The FELA provides that,
"Every common carrier by railroad . .. shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of
the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the
[Vol. 39
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able that Congress' inaction in response to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FELA and the Jones Act as deny-
ing recovery of non-pecuniary benefits has ripened into a
"considered judgment" on the issue.
In the first reported post-Higginbotham case, a panel of
the Fifth Circuit concluded that Moragne may not be utilized
to supplement the Jones Act and permit recovery of non-
pecuniary damages." Judge Rubin, speaking for the court, first
noted that one of the decedents in Higginbotham, Shinn, was
a Jones Act seaman; thus, he concluded, the Supreme Court's
denial of damages for loss, of society to all of the plaintiffs
carried with it a determination, sub silentio, that the benefi-
ciaries of a Jones Act seaman killed beyond three miles could
not recover loss of society under Moragne and Gaudet. Then
Judge Rubin concluded that permitting recovery of loss of
society by beneficiaries of a Jones Act seaman "merely because
the accident occurred within territorial waters" would be in-
consistent with the policy adopted by the Court in Higgin-
botham, because it would differentiate between the statutorily
imposed limitation on damages created by DOHSA and the
judicially created limitation imposed by the Jones Act.39 Such
a result would also create "two separate Jones Act remedies,
each applicable only within its own geographical sphere.""
The Court's conclusion in Ivy, although compelling, was
not compelled. In fact, the Fifth Circuit's decision may not
survive its own scrutiny, since a rehearing en banc has been
granted. Nowhere in Higginbotham did the Supreme Court
allude to the Jones Act status of Shinn and his beneficiaries,
and this omission makes it at least arguable that
Higginbotham does -not represent. the Supreme Court's
"considered judgment" on the issue, to borrow a phrase. Simi-
larly, it is not at all clear that the Court will not tolerate two
surviving widow or husband and children of such employee." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939).
In Michigan Central R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913), the Supreme Court
interpreted the FELA wrongful death provision, adopted for seamen by the Jones Act,
as limiting recovery to financial or pecuniary loss.
38. Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. Id. at 738. The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the Supreme Court "failed to
differentiate" is technically correct, but it should be noted that the Supreme Court
made no reference whatsoever to the Jones Act in its Higginbotham decision.
40. Id.
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separate Jones Act remedies separated by the line between
territorial waters and the high seas. The Court has tolerated a
similar bifurcation in the area of unseaworthiness, which is
simply another part of the same remedy,' and in
Higginbotham the majority expressed a lack of concern about
"minor threat[s] to . . . uniformity."4 Consequently, the Ivy
court may have read too much into the Court's silence in
Higginbotham.
3. The Limitations Period
Maritime common law applies the doctrine of laches to bar
stale claims involving unreasonable delay and prejudice to the
defendant. Both the Jones Act and DOHSA provide prescrip-
tive periods," and the language of Higginbotham indicates that
the Court would not welcome an argument that a claim pre-
scribed under either statute could nevertheless be kept alive by
coupling the Jones Act or DOHSA claim with a Moragne claim
and applying the doctrine of laches."1 However, another anom-
aly results: a seaman's claim for unseaworthiness is barred
after two years if it occurred beyond three miles, but the same
claim may still be viable if it occurred within three miles.
4. Survival Actions
The Jones Act provides a general survivial action-
regardless of whether the decendent filed suit before death,
his personal representative may recover the damages he could
have recovered if he had lived." DOHSA, however, contains
41. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 98 S. Ct. at 2015 & n.20.
42. Id. at 2014.
43. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Czaplicki v. S.S.
Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); Garnder v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29
(1951).
44. DOHSA provides for a two year statute of limitations period. 46 U.S.C. § 763
(1920). When the Jones Act was adopted in 1920, the period of limitations for the FELA
was two years. That period was extended to three years in 1939, 45 U.S.C. § 56, and
was incorporated into Jones Act actions. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357
U.S. 221, 225 n.6 (1958).
45. The Court in Higginbotham expressly stated that Congress, through
DOHSA, has announced its considered judgment on the applicable limitations period
outside territorial waters. 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978).
46. The Jones Act provides that "in case of death of any seaman as a result of
any . . . personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may bring an
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no general survival provision, but does have a "non-abate-
ment" provision, which provides:
If a person die as the result of such wrongful act,
during the pendency in a court of admiralty of the United
States of a suit to recover damages for personal injuries in
respect of such act, . . . the personal representative of the
decedent may be substituted as a party and the suit may
proceed as a suit under this chapter for the recovery of the
compensation provided in section 762 of this title.47
This seldom-cited provision apparently provides that upon the
victim's death his pending personal injury action may be con-
verted into a DOHSA wrongful death action by his beneficia-
ries. However, it has not been applied to preclude the mainte-
nance of a separate survival action by a personal representative
when death ensues before any judicial proceedings have com-
menced.
The Supreme Court has not yet Spoken to the issue of
whether admiralty common law permits recovery of survival
damages, 8 but the lower courts have unanimously answered
the question in the affirmative."8 Assuming there is a general
survival action in maritime common law, it will not conflict
action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes
of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case
of railway employees shall be applicable." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920). The statutes referred
to in the Jones Act are the wrongful death and survival provisions of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1939). Under section 59 of the
FELA, "any right of action given . . . to a person suffering injury shall survive to his
or her personal representative . . . ." 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1939). Section 59 allows recovery
for "the wrong to injured person and is confined to his personal loss and suffering before
he died . . . ." St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 658
(1915). See also Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955).
47. 46 U.S.C. § 765 (1920).
48. In Moragne, the Court restricted its comments to whether an action for
wrongful death existed under admiralty common law. In Gaudet, the Court was exclu-
sively concerned with whether wrongful death damages could be recovered after the
decedent had recovered for his disability, pain and suffering, and loss of earnings. In
Higginbotham, the Supreme Court held that DOHSA's provision limiting recovery in
wrongful death cases to pecuniary loss could not be supplemented by the admiralty
common law wrongful death remedy allowing recovery of non-pecuniary loss.
49. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976); Law v. Sea Drilling Corp.,
510 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1975); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Spiller
v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assoc., Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972); Dennis v. Central
Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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with the Jones Act. The major issue is whether any common
law survival action conflicts with the provisions of DOHSA.
Put another way, the issue is whether the limited non-
abatement and conversion provisions of section 765 represent
Congress' "considered judgment" on the entire question of sur-
vival actions beyond three miles.
The possible conflict between any survival action at admi-
ralty common law and section 765 could be avoided by a Su-
preme Court decision denying survival damages under mari-
time common law. Such a decision arguably would do no vio-
lence to the policies which should dictate the path of mari-
time tort law. It is one thing to say that the beneficiaries of a
person killed in maritime employment can recover nothing; it
is quite another to say that those beneficiaries can not re-
cover, in addition to the damages which they have sustained
as a result of the death, the "windfall" of the damages the '
victim could have recovered if he had lived. A remedy for the
former may be necessary to encOurage maritime employment;
a remedy for the latter seemingly would have little bearing on
that policy.IIf admiralty common law does not provide for survival
benefits, the courts may continue the practice of "borrowing"
state statutes. However, if common law does provide such a
remedy, but DOHSA precludes its application beyond three
miles because Congress is found to have considered and re-
jected any survival beyond section 765, then it appears illogical
to hold that common law can "borrow" a state statute to afford
such a remedy.
ALTERNATIVE COURSES
Higginbotham precludes recovery of non-pecuniary dam-
ages for wrongful death beyond three miles. The Jones Act,-
however, does not necessarily represent Congress' considered
judgment on recovery of non-pecuniary damages, and the
Court might permit Moragne to supplement the Jones Act by
permitting recovery of loss of society. This would produce the
anomaly that the beneficiaries of a seaman killed by negligence
or unseaworthiness within three miles could recover for loss of
society, but could not do so if he was killed by unseaworthiness
beyond three miles. These types of inconsistencies-"minor
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threat[s] to uniformity" 5°0-may not bother the post-
Higginbotham Court and thus, may be allowed to develop.
However, there is another possibility. Moragne was premised
in part on uniformity of recovery, and since Moragne damages
can not be awarded where a federal statute provides otherwise,
uniformity can only be achieved by a revision of the elements
of recoverable damages at common law. Gaudet, it must be
remembered, was a five to four decision, and the Court was
hard-pressed to distinguish between the types of non-pecuniary
damages it was permitting (loss of society) and other non-
pecuniary damages, such as grief," for which recovery was de-
nied. One possible aftermath of Higginbotham could be that
Gaudet will be overruled, and wrongful death recovery under
Moragne will be limited to pecuniary damages.
Another possibility is that the Court will ignore the incon-
sistency between permitting recovery of non-pecuniary dam-
ages within three miles but not beyond, because it does not
think that the practical effect is significant." Of course, much
50. In Higginbotham, the majority wrote, "We recognize today, as we did in
Moragne, the value of uniformity, but a ruling that DOHSA governs wrongful death
recoveries on the high seas poses only a minor threat to the uniformity of maritime
law." 98 S. Ct. at 2014.
51. In what has been called "the least convincing footnote in the history of our
jurisprudence," G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, at 372, the majority in Gaudet
distinguished loss of society from non-recoverable damages for grief with this language:
Loss of society must not be confused with mental anguish or grief, which is not
compensable under the maritime wrongful-death remedy. The former entails
the loss of positive benefits, while the latter represents an emotional response
to the wrongful death. The difference between the two is well expressed as
follows:
"When we speak of recovery for the beneficiaries' mental anguish, we are
primarily concerned, not with the benefits they have lost, but with the issue of
compensating them for their harrowing experience resulting from the death of
a loved one. This requires a somewhat negative approach. The fundamental
question in this area of damages is what deleterious effect has the death, as such,
had upon the claimants? In other areas of damage, we focus on more positive
aspects of the injury such as what would the decedent, had he lived, have
contributed in terms of support, assistance, training, comfort, consortium, etc.
... The great majority of jurisdictions, including several which do allow dam-
ages for other types of non-pecuniary loss, hold that the grief, bereavement,
anxiety, distress, or mental pain and suffering of the beneficiaries may not be
regarded as elements of damage in a wrongful death action."
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 n.17 (1974) (emphasis in original)
(quoting S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 3.45 at 223).
52. The majority in Higginbotham, perhaps acknowledging the limited impor-
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of what is recoverable under loss of society may be subject to
purchase upon the open market and thus treated as a
"pecuniary loss"; where it is not, such as the loss of love and
affection, it is difficult to distinguish such loss from compensa-
ble loss of "services" such as care, guidance, and training. At-
torneys engaged in litigating these kinds of cases, however, may
feel that there is a great practical effect in providing the judge
with an additional element of damages, or providing the jury
with an additional damage charge and an additional blank in
the special verdict. Certainly, the six-figure sums which would
otherwise have been awarded for loss of society in
Higginbotham53 were not deemed insignificant by the litigants.
Unless awards for loss of society are limited to insignificant
sums, a possibility which the Court alluded to in
Higginbotham,5' the practical effect of allowing their recovery
could be very great indeed.
CONCLUSION
In Moragne, Justice Harlan dwelled upon the anomalies
which had arisen in maritime wrongful death law, because of
the lack of a common law theory of recovery. Now, eight years
after the Court created a common law right of recovery, the
area remains riddled with anomalies. To any scholar who con-
cluded in 1970 that the Court would no longer tolerate anom-
alies, Higginbotham must have come as a shock and could only
mean that Gaudet could not persist. But the anomalies of 1970
may have troubled the Court simply because in a limited but
important situation-a seaman or Sieracki seaman killed by
unseaworthiness within territorial waters-there was a possi-
bility of no recovery at all, a result clearly counterproductive
to federal maritime policy. Creating a maritime common law
with specified elements of damages. remedied that situation,
but any inconsistencies as to the amount of recovery-
tance of the issue, wrote: "It remains to be seen whether the difference between
awarding loss of society damages under Gaudet and denying them under DOHSA has
great practical significance. It may be argued that the competing views. . . can best
be reconciled by allowing an award that is primarily symbolic ... " 98 S. Ct. at 2015
n.20.
53. 98 S. Ct. at 2012.
54. See note 51, supra.
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admittedly a factor of much less importance to maritime po-
licy-were left to prior or subsequent Congressional action.55
Certainly, the Court has tolerated a more startling anomaly,
the different treatment for "seamen" aboard "jack-up" rigs
and "laborers" on fixed rigs, doing the same work in the same
place and subject to the same maritime perils.56
It is curious to note that Justice Harlan, rejecting in
Moragne the plea of stare decisis, commented about the uncer-
tainty that existed because there was no common law remedy. 7
Higginbotham seems to assure us that the creation of a com-
mon law remedy will cause uncertainty for some time to come.
55. Thus, in footnote eighteen of Higginbotham, the Court wrote:
Moragne proclaimed the need for uniformity in a far more compelling context.
When Moragne was decided, fatal accidents nearer shore might yield more
generous awards, or none at all, depending on the law of the nearest State. The
only disparity that concerns us today is the difference between applying one
national rule to fatalities in territorial waters and a slightly narrower national
rule to accidents farther from land.
98 S. Ct. at 2014 n.18.
56. In a series of cases beginning with Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th
Cir. 1959), the Fifth Circuit has held that employees working on movable oil-drilling
rigs (jack-up rigs) and the like may qualify as Jones Act seamen. Se also Barrios v.
Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1972). On the other hand,
under maritime common law and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §
1331 et seq. (1953), permanently affixed offshore installations are removed from admi-
ralty law and treated as "artificial islands." Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 395
U.S. 352 (1969). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, § 6-21 at 328; Marine
Drilling Co. v. Austin, 363 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1966); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray,
361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966).
57. Justice Harlan wrote:
Nor do either of the other relevant strands of stare decisis counsel persuasively
against the overruling of The Harrisburg. Certainly the courts could not provide
expeditious resolution of disputes if every rule were fair game for de novo recon-
sideration in every case. However, the situation we face is far removed from any
such consequence as that. We do not regard the rule of The Harrisburg as a
closely arguable proposition-it rested on a most dubious foundation when an-
nounced, has become an increasingly unjustifiable anomaly as the law over the
years has left it behind, and, in conjunction with its corollary, The Tungus, has
produced litigation-spawning confusion in an area that should be easily suscep-
tible of more workable solutions. The rule has had a long opportunity to prove
its acceptability, and instead has suffered universal criticism and wide repudia-
tion. To supplant the present disarray in this area with a rule both simpler and
more just will further, not impede, efficiency in adjudication. 398 U.S. at 404-
05.
